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What Osama’s Really Saying 
CCS Analysis  
 
On November 29, a new missive from Osama bin Laden was released to the 
world. The message came first to the news outlet al Jeezera,1 where most of his 
messages have been passed, and at the time of writing, it has not been confirmed 
by the intelligence community that it is in fact Bin Laden. Assuming it is, 
however, the message bears some very real implications for the ongoing conflict 
in Afghanistan.  
 
In the message, among other things, bin Laden said that Europe would do well 
to withdraw from Afghanistan as “the American tide is receding.”2 Afghanistan 
and other nations reacted quickly, saying that the mission in Afghanistan was a 
united one between the government of Afghanistan and international forces, and 
that a withdrawal of foreign forces was not an option and that security in that 
country was “…an international responsibility.”3 President Karzai went further 
and called the idea of a European withdrawal “ridiculous.”4 As Iraq (relatively) 
stabilizes, however, and even the staunchest of allies such as Australia pull out of 
that country, troop commitments in Afghanistan will be subjects of debate in a 
number of European capitals. Furthermore, as security deteriorates in 
Afghanistan, many at home and abroad are increasingly viewing the situation 
there as a quagmire.5 Bin Laden’s words have no bearing among the 
international forces, but it does show that he has a certain understanding of the 
international politics at play in Afghanistan, and is desperate to exploit divisions 
among the allies. 
 
Bin Laden also claimed full responsibility for the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
and said that the Taliban knew nothing of the plot beforehand, saying “I am the 
one responsible… The Afghan people and government knew nothing 
whatsoever about these events.”6 This is the most important part of his 
transmission, meant not for European capitals so much as the Karzai government 
and its U.S. allies. The Taliban has been making overtures to the Afghan 
government, seeking a negotiated settlement.7 There are elements within the 
Taliban that are not happy being grouped with extremists such as former 
commanders Mullah Dadullah and Jalaluddin Haqqani, and are seeking to join a 
new Afghan government. Former Taliban have already been incorporated into 
the government at the district and provincial levels; their further assimilation is 
entirely possible. 
 
Why would bin Laden push for this? He owes the Taliban, and he knows it. 
Without their support, and that of their tribal brethren, he could easily have been 
captured or killed in the wilds of Afghanistan after 9/11. He ruined, almost 
single-handedly, their first government, although it is debatable how much they 
knew of it beforehand. What is clear is that no matter how much the Taliban 
knew of the 9/11 plot before it took place, they did not anticipate in any way the 
fierce reaction from the United States. Now bin Laden wants to remove the 
original stain on the Taliban reputation that led to their downfall. 
 
We expect the Taliban to continue a twin pronged offensive; militarily to prove 
they can still be effective and to point out the current government of 
Afghanistan’s weakness, and diplomatically as they pursue negotiations. They 
know violence alone will not bring them any closer to power; after their last 
period of rule, less than 5% of Afghanistan wants them back in power.8 
 
It is now up to the Afghan government and the allies what they want to do with 
these Taliban overtures. Bin Laden’s pronouncement shows some seriousness 
missing from their previous attempts at negotiations, when they demanded all 
foreign forces withdraw, all Taliban prisoners be released, and power over ten 
southern key provinces.9 Moderate elements of the Taliban do exist and should 
be incorporated into the government. Bin Laden is not one of them, however, 
and any claims he makes should be taken with a bucket of salt.  
 
Negotiations are important, and as previous Afghan conflicts have shown, 
inevitable. On the one hand, the government and allies must beware of throwing 
out the baby with the bathwater; i.e. dismissing patriotic Pashtun tribal leaders 
for mistakes made long ago when the Taliban was the power in Southern 
Afghanistan. On the other hand, the government must be wary of Greeks bearing 
gifts; any recommendation from bin Laden certainly falls into this category. 
 
Careful study and in-depth analysis of former Taliban leaders will give the best 
indication of who can be trusted. Bin Laden’s pronouncement should be ignored 
at the risk of making some too willing to negotiate, or others too hesitant. His 
moment of influence in Afghan politics ended long ago.  
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